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1Environmental Policy, Spatial Spillovers and the Emergence of
Economic Agglomerations
Abstract
We explain the spatial concentration of economic activity, in a model of economic ge-
ography, when the cost of environmental policy - which is increasing in the concentration
of pollution - and an immobile production factor act as centrifugal forces, while posi-
tive knowledge spillovers and iceberg transportation costs act as centripetal forces. We
study the agglomeration e￿ects caused by trade-o￿s between centripetal and centrifugal
forces. The above e￿ects govern ￿rms’ location decisions and, as a result, they de￿ne the
distribution of economic activity across space. We derive the rational expectations equi-
librium, which results either in a monocentric or in a polycentric city, and the regulator’s
optimum, which results in a bicentric city. We compare the outcomes and characterize
the optimal spatial policies.
JEL classi￿cation: R38, Q58.
Keywords: Agglomeration, Space, Pollution, Environmental Policy, Knowledge Spillovers,
Transportation Cost.
21 Introduction
The distribution of population and activity across the landscape is undoubtedly uneven.
Metropolitan areas - large population centers - play a major role in economic activity.
Most OECD metropolitan areas have a higher GDP per capita and a higher labor pro-
ductivity level than their national average and many of them tend to have faster growth
rates than their countries as a whole. For example, ^ Ile-de-France is the most populated
region of France - it accounts for 2.2% of the area of the country and 18.1% of its popula-
tion. Economically, ^ Ile-de-France is one of the richest regions in the world and produces
28.2% of the GDP of France.1
The concept of a \metropolitan area" is based on the concept of a business or labor
market area and is typically de￿ned as an employment core (an area with a high density
of available jobs) and the surrounding areas that have strong commuting ties to the core.
Tokyo, Seoul, Mexico City, New Delhi and New York City are some examples of the largest
metropolitan areas in the world, which include a large number of industries.2 This process
of clustering of economic activity in space is studied by agglomeration economics.
Agglomeration, once created, is sustained as a result of circular logic. For example, a
shop is more likely to locate in a shopping street than in the centre of a residential area
with no shops around. The same happens with specialized economic regions, like Silicon
Valley. Silicon Valley is so famous for its development as a high-tech economic center
and its large number of innovators and manufacturers, that the term is now generally
used as a metonym for the high-tech sector. In Europe, large corporations and service
or research centers, such as IBM, General Motors Europe, Toyota Europe, Google and
Microsoft are moving to Zurich, which is a leading ￿nancial centre.
Despite their particular importance and interest, the spatial decisions of ￿rms and
economic agents haven’t attracted a lot of attention from mainstream economics until
recently. Some exceptions are earlier works that belong to the ￿eld of urban economics
1Its total GDP was e533:5 billion in 2007 with per capita GDP of e45;982 the same year (see
http://www.insee.fr/fr/ppp/bases-de-donnees/donnees-detaillees/cnat-region/pib reg.xls).
2For a review of metropolitan areas, see OECD [27].
3and have some kind of spatial structure.3 Those works are very well analysed in the
monograph, \The Spatial Economy", by Fujita, Krugman and Venables [8].
In the 1990’s, space started attracting the interest of economists again. According to
Krugman [21], the reason for this renewed interest was the fact that it is now possible
to model imperfect competition, and concepts like unexhausted scale economies are no
longer intractable. The result was the emergence of New Economic Geography (NEG),
which represents a new branch of spatial economics. The purpose of NEG is to explain
the formation of a large variety of economic agglomerations in geographical space.
Economic models of agglomeration are based on centripetal forces that promote the
concentration of economic activity and centrifugal forces that oppose it, studying the
trade-o￿s between various forms of increasing returns and di￿erent types of mobility
costs.4 Moreover, some recent studies have included knowledge externalities - as agglom-
eration forces - in a spatial context.5 These kinds of models have three forces that de￿ne
the equilibrium allocation of business and residential areas: transportation costs and
production externalities, which both pull economic activities together, and immobility of
factors that pushes them apart.
Another characteristic of the models already referred to is the assumption that the
spatial area under study is homogeneous. Contrary to this assumption, economic ac-
tivities are spatially concentrated because of dissimilarities in natural features, such as
rivers, harbors or even exhaustible resources that are available in certain points in space.
This \￿rst nature" advantage hasn’t been studied in depth yet. An exception is Fujita
and Mori’s [10] paper that explained the role of ports in the formation of cities, using an
increasing returns model. This assumption of nonuniformity in geographical space will
be introduced in our model too.
Furthermore, cities are important generators of wealth, employment and productivity
growth. The growing economic importance of places with high concentration of economic
activity, such as metropolitan areas, raises important policy issues. More precisely, these
3For example, von Th￿ unen [35], Alonso [2], and Henderson [13].
4Some examples are Krugman [18], [19], [20], Fugita, Krugman and Mori [9]. For a detailed discussion
on forces that a￿ect geographical concentration see Krugman [21].
5See Lucas [23], Lucas and Rossi-Hansberg [24], Rossi-Hansberg [30].
4economic activities are not only associated with positive externalities, but also with cer-
tain negative externalities, such as congestion, pollution or high crime rates. Considering
these issues, we try to model the problem of pollution and explain the spatial patterns
of economic activity under environmental policy. Contrary to other NEG models, we
explicitly assume that pollution di￿uses in space.6 This means that emissions generated
at a spatial point a￿ect the concentration of pollution in nearby areas.7
According to Rauscher, if pollution is taken into account, two spatial patterns are
formed.8 In the ￿rst case, consumers trying to avoid pollution leave agglomerations, but
the industry follows them in order to locate where consumption is. On the other hand,
if environmental damage is large, consumers and the industry agglomerate in di￿erent
locations. In that case, the high concentration of pollution promotes dispersion. An
example of this dispersion is nuclear power stations, which locate in regions with low
concentration of economic activity and population. As far as policy issues are concerned,
there is a lot of research on how environmental regulation a￿ects the location decisions
of ￿rms. Henderson [14] shows that air quality regulation a￿ects industrial location.
Thus, pollution industries spread out, moving from polluted to cleaner areas to reduce
regulatory scrutiny. Greenstone [12], using data from the Clean Air Act in the US,
￿nds that environmental regulation restricts industrial activity. To put it di￿erently,
environmental policy acts as a centrifugal force.
In that context, we study the spatial structure of a single city or well-de￿ned region
when ￿rms are free to choose where to locate. As far as production is concerned, we
assume positive knowledge spillovers. There are a lot of empirical studies that con￿rm the
role of knowledge spillovers in the location decisions of ￿rms and explain why ￿rms choose
to locate near each other. More speci￿cally, Keller [17] ￿nds that technological knowledge
6Lange and Quaas [22] and van Marrewijk [34] study the e￿ect of pollution on agglomeration assuming
local pollution.
7In a recent work, Arnott et al. [1] asume non-local pollution while investigating the role of space
in the control of pollution externalities by using a di￿erent conceptual framework. Our model includes
additional important determinants of agglomeration, such as spatial inhomogeneity and production ex-
ternalities.
8See Rauscher M., \Concentration, Separation and Dispersion: Economic Geography and the En-
vironment", Paper presented at the 2008 Conference of European Association of Environmental and
Resource Economists in Gothenberg, Sweden.
5spillovers are signi￿cantly local and their bene￿ts decline with distance. Bottazzi and
Peri [4], using data for European regions, prove that knowledge spillovers resulting from
patent applications are very localised and positively a￿ect regions within a distance of
300 km. Carlino, Chatterjee and Hunt [7] also provide evidence on patent intensity
for metropolitan areas in the US and conclude that it is a￿ected by employment density.
These two characteristics, the employment density around a spatial point and the distance
between ￿rms, are used in the modeling of knowledge spillovers.
We further assume here that ￿rms use emissions as an input. The government, in
order to avoid a high concentration of pollution in a single area, adopts environmental
regulations. These regulations impose an additional production cost on ￿rms. We assume
that the environmental regulations refer to general environmental costs such as taxes or
the cost of controlling the environment and imposing zoning systems which all increase
with the concentration of pollution. As a result, the production process becomes more
expensive, as ￿rms have to pay an extra amount of money that depends not only on the
emissions they generate, but also on the concentration of pollution at the point where
they decide to locate. The higher the number of ￿rms at a certain point, the higher will
be the concentration of pollution at that point.
Now, ￿rms have to take into account two things: if they locate near other ￿rms, they
will bene￿t from positive knowledge spillovers, but they will have to pay a higher price
for each unit of emissions used in the production of output. They also have to consider
di￿erent transportation costs at each spatial point and the immobility of production
factors. Under these assumptions, we de￿ne a rational expectations equilibrium (REE)
and an optimal concentration of economic activity, we identify deviations between the
two solutions and we discuss policies with spatial characteristics.
The contribution of this paper is in combining the assumption of pollution di￿using
in space with other forces that have been proved to a￿ect economic agglomerations.
More speci￿cally, we show how externalities in production, transportation costs, spatial
inhomogeneity and the concentration of pollution, which determines the structure of
environmental policy, a￿ect the location of economic activity. The above determinants
6of agglomeration not only provide new results for the REE and the optimal solution,
but also make it clear that the two solutions have signi￿cant di￿erences in all cases. In
particular, we show that at the regulator’s optimum, the city is always bicentric, while
at the REE, the city is either monocentric or polycentric.
The plan of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, we present the model and its
mathematical structure and prove the existence and the uniqueness of the REE. In Section
3, we determine the regulator’s optimum, while in Section 4, we derive optimal spatial
policies. In Section 5, we make some numerical experiments and compare the di￿erent
output distributions corresponding to the REE and the optimal solutions, both in cases
where environmental policy is imposed and in cases where environmental policy issues
are not taken into account. We also refer to the concept of \pollution haven hypothesis"
and show how it could be modelled using our modelling structure. In the ￿nal section,
we make some concluding remarks and give some ideas for future research.
2 Rational Expectations Equilibrium under Centripetal
and Centrifugal Forces
We consider a single city or region located on a line of length S. So, 0 and S represent
the western and eastern borders of the city, which is part of a large economy. In the city,
there is a large number of small, identical ￿rms that produce a single good. There are
also workers who live at their workplaces and take no location decisions. The production
process is characterized by externalities in the form of positive knowledge spillovers. This
means that ￿rms bene￿t from locating near each other and the total advantage they take
depends on the amount of labor used in nearby areas and on the distance between them.
There is a port available at the point ￿ r 2 [0;S] in our city, which is used to import
machinery. So, machinery is another production factor that arrives at the port at a given
price.9 But the transportation of machinery inside the city is costly. This means that the
point ￿ r has a spatial advantage, because if ￿rms decide to locate there, they will pay no
9We assume that machinery producers provide their products at a given price that includes the
transportation cost to the port.
7transportation cost for machinery. At all other points, the transportation cost will add
an additional cost to the production process.
The last assumption we make is that emissions are used as an input in the production
process.10 According to Brock [5], the idea behind this assumption is that techniques
of production are less costly in terms of capital input (machinery in our case) if more
emissions are allowed - a situation which is observed in the real world. In other words, if
we use polluting techniques, we can reduce the total cost of production.
The borders of the city under study are strictly de￿ned and ￿rms can locate nowhere
else.11 Our intention is to study the location decisions of ￿rms. More speci￿cally, we aim
to consider the equilibrium spatial distribution of production in order to determine the
distribution of ￿rms over sites r 2 [0;S].
All ￿rms produce the same traded good using labor, machinery, emissions and land.
The good is sold around the world at a competitive price assuming no transportation






where q is the output, L is the labor input, K is the machinery input, E is the amount of
emissions used in production and z is the production externality, which depends on how







10The concept of emissions / pollution as an input in the production function was ￿rst introduced by
Brock [5] and later used by other authors, eg. Jouvet et al. [16], Rauscher [29], Stokey [31], Tahvonen
and Kuuluvainen [32], Xepapadeas [36].
11Land is owned by landlords who play no role in our analysis.
12This assumption is used by Lucas and Rossi-Hansberg [24]. Alternatively, we could assume that the
good is exported from the port to the larger economy at a ￿xed (competitive) price, but the transportation
to the port is costly. In that case, the transportation cost of the output would push economic activity
to concentrate around the port and would have the same implications as the transportation cost of the
machinery input.
13This kind of external e￿ects is used by Lucas [23] and by Lucas and Rossi-Hansberg [24] - with a
di￿erent structure - and is consistent with Fujita and Thisse’s [11] analysis. The idea is that workers at
a spatial point bene￿t from labor in nearby areas and thus, the distance between ￿rms determines the
production of ideas and the productivity of ￿rms in a given region.
8The function k(r;s) = e￿￿(r￿s)2 is called a kernel. The production externality is a
positive function of labor employed in all areas and is assumed to be linear and to decay
exponentially at a rate ￿ with the distance between r and s: A high ￿ indicates that
only labor in nearby areas a￿ects production positively. In other words, the higher ￿
is, the more pro￿table it is for ￿rms to locate near each other. When the production
externality plays a major role in location decisions, each ￿rm chooses to locate where all
other ￿rms are located. In terms of agglomeration economics, the production externality
is a centripetal force, i.e. a force that promotes the spatial concentration of economic
activity.
As already stated, there is a port at the point ￿ r 2 [0;S], which is used for the imports
of machinery. It is clear that the point ￿ r has spatial advantages over other possible
locations. If the price of machinery at ￿ r is pK; then iceberg transportation costs imply
that the price at location r can be written as pK(r) = pK e￿(r￿￿ r)2: In other words, if
one unit of machinery is transported from ￿ r to r, only a fraction e￿￿(r￿￿ r)2 reaches r:14
So, ￿ is the transportation cost per square unit of distance, which is assumed to be
positive and ￿nite. It is obvious that the total transportation cost of machinery increases
with distance.15 Thus, ￿rms have an incentive to locate near point ￿ r to avoid a higher
transportation cost. Like knowledge spillovers, the transportation cost is a centripetal
force.
The emissions used in the production process damage the environment. The damage




where ￿ ￿ 1; D0(X) > 0; D00(X) ￿ 0; and the marginal damage function is:
MD(r) = ￿ X(r)
￿￿1 (4)
14For a detailed analysis of \iceberg costs", see Fujita, Krugman and Venables [8] and Fujita and
Thisse [11]. Conceptually, with the \iceberg" forms, we assume that a fraction of the good transported
melts away or evaporates in transit.
15We can use another formulation of iceberg transportation cost, pK(r) = pK e￿jr￿￿ rj instead of pK(r) =
pK e￿(r￿￿ r)
2
; without changing the conclusions of the analysis.
9Each ￿rm has to pay a \price" or a tax for each unit of emissions it generates. This
tax ￿ is a function of the marginal damage (MD):
￿(r) = ￿ MD(r) (5)
where 0 ￿ ￿ ￿ 1, and ￿ = 1 means that the full marginal damage at point r is charged as
a tax. In other words, each ￿rm pays an amount of money for the emissions used in the
production of the output, but the per unit tax depends not only on its own emissions,
but also on the concentration of pollution at the spatial point where it decides to locate.
The tax function can be written as:
￿(r) = ￿ ￿ X(r)
￿￿1 =   X(r)
￿￿1 (6)
where   = ￿ ￿; ￿0(X) > 0; ￿00(X) ￿ 0:
When solving our model, we use the logarithm of the tax function, thus:








Equation (8) implies that aggregate pollution (X) at a point r is a weighted average
of the emissions generated in nearby locations, with kernel k(r;s) = e￿￿(r￿s)2. This might
capture the movement of emissions in nearby places. A high ￿ indicates that only nearby
emissions a￿ect the concentration of pollution at point r: In the real world, the value of ￿
depends on weather conditions and on natural landscape. As we have assumed that the
only dissimilarity in our land is the existence of a port, we suppose that ￿ is in￿uenced
only by weather conditions. Speci￿cally, if it is windy, ￿ takes a low value and areas
at a long distance from r are polluted by emissions generated at r. As ￿ increases, the
concentration of emissions in certain areas does not pollute other areas so much. As far
as ￿ is concerned, it is just used to re￿ect local weather conditions which a￿ect the level
10of pollution at each site.
Thus, the cost of environmental policy, ￿(X(r)); increases the total production cost
for the ￿rms. The extra amount of money that a ￿rm pays, in the form of taxation,
depends on the concentration of pollution at the point where it has decided to locate. To
put it di￿erently, the higher the concentration of industry at an interval [s1;s2] 2 [0;S];
the higher the cost ￿rms will be obliged to pay. In that way, the environmental policy is
a centrifugal force, i.e. a force that opposes spatial concentration of economic activity.
Let w be the wage rate, which is the same across sites, and let p be the competitive
price of output.16 A ￿rm located at r chooses labor, machinery and emissions to maximize
its pro￿ts. Thus, the pro￿t per unit of land, ^ Q; at location r; is given by:






c ￿ wL(r) ￿ pK e
￿(r￿r)2
K(r) ￿ ￿(r) E(r) (9)
A ￿rm located at site r treats the production externality z(r) and the concentration
of pollution X(r) as exogenous parameters ze and Xe respectively. Assuming X(r) is
exogenous to the ￿rm implies that the tax ￿(r) is treated as a parameter at each r.

















c￿1 = ￿(r) (10c)
where ￿(r) =   X(r)￿￿1: Setting z(r) = ze, X(r) = Xe, the FOC de￿ne a rational
expectations equilibrium spatial distribution of labor, machinery and emissions at each
point r 2 [0;S]: After taking logs on both sides and doing some transformations, which
are described in Appendix A, the FOC result in a system of second kind Fredholm integral
16Real wages are constant which means that the marginal product of labor, as de￿ned by the FOC
(10a), is constant across locations. This assumption is also used by Rossi-Hansberg [30] who investigates
the spatial distribution of economic activity and the associated trade patterns. In Section 3, where we
study the optimal distribution of economic activity, the marginal product of labor di￿ers across sites (see
equation (16a) below).










































"(s)ds + g3(r) = "(r)
where y(r) = lnL(r), x(r) = lnK(r); "(r) = lnE(r) and g1(r); g2(r); g3(r) are some
known functions.
Proposition 1 . Assume that: (i) the kernel k(r;s) de￿ned on [0;2￿] ￿ [0;2￿] is an
L2￿kernel which generates the compact operator W; (ii) 1 ￿ a ￿ b ￿ c is not an eigen-
value of W; and (iii) G is a square integrable function, then a unique solution determining
the rational expectations equilibrium distribution of inputs and output exists.
The proof of existence and uniqueness of the REE is presented in the following steps:17






2 drds < 1:
The kernels of our model have the following formulation: e￿￿ (r￿s)2 with ￿ = ￿; ￿
(positive numbers) and are de￿ned on [0;2￿] ￿ [0;2￿]:





￿ ￿ ￿e￿￿ (r￿s)2￿ ￿ ￿
2
drds < 1:












e￿ (r￿s)2 takes its highest value when e￿ (r￿s)2 is very small. But the lowest

























drds = 4 ￿2 < 1:
Thus, the kernels of our system are L2￿kernels.




k (r;s)￿(s)ds ;a ￿ s ￿ b
17See Moiseiwitsch [26] for more detailed de￿nitions.










So, in our model the upper bound of the norm of the operator generated by the
























￿ If k (r;s) is an L2￿ kernel and W is a bounded operator generated by k; then W is
a compact operator.







W Y = G (12)
has a unique solution for all square integrable functions G; if (1 ￿ a ￿ b ￿ c) is not






is invertible. We show in Appendix C that the system (11)
can be transformed into a second kind Fredholm Integral equation of the form (12).
To solve the system (11) numerically, for the REE, we use a modi￿ed Taylor-series
expansion method (Maleknejad et al. [25]). More precisely, a Taylor-series expansion can
be made for the solutions y(s) and "(s) in the integrals of the system (11). We use the
￿rst two terms of the Taylor-series expansion (as an approximation for y(s) and "(s)) and
substitute them into the integrals of (11). After some substitutions, we end up with a
linear system of ordinary di￿erential equations of the form:
￿11(r) y(r) + ￿12(r) y
0(r) + ￿13 y
00(r) + ￿11 "(r) + ￿12 "
0(r) + ￿13 "
00(r) = g1(r) (13)
x(r) + ￿21(r) y(r) + ￿22(r) y
0(r) + ￿23 y
00(r) + ￿21 "(r) + ￿22 "
0(r) + ￿23 "
00(r) = g2(r)
￿31(r) y(r) + ￿32(r) y
0(r) + ￿33 y
00(r) + ￿31 "(r) + ￿32 "
0(r) + ￿33 "
00(r) = g3(r)
In order to solve the linear system (13), we need an appropriate number of boundary
conditions. We construct them and then we obtain a linear system of three algebraic
13equations that can be solved numerically.
The maximized value of the ￿rm’s pro￿ts ^ Q(r) is also the land-rent per unit of land
that a ￿rm would be willing to pay to operate with these cost and productivity parameters
at location r. Since the decision problem at each location is completely determined by the
technology level z; the wage rate w, the price of machinery pK , the output price p and
the concentration of pollution X; the FOC of the maximization problem give us the REE
values of labor, machinery and emissions used at each location: L = ^ L(z;w;pK;p;X),
K = ^ K(z;w;pK;p;X) and E = ^ E(z;w;pK;p;X): Finally, the equilibrium distribution
of output is given by: q = ^ q(z;w;pK;p;X):
3 The Regulator’s Optimum
After having solved for the REE, we study the optimal solution by assuming the existence
of a regulator who takes all the location decisions. The regulator’s objective is to maximize
the total value of land in the city, which implies maximization of the pro￿ts net of
pollution damages across the spatial domain. It’s clear that the regulator takes into




























































Comparing the FOC for the optimum to those for the REE, we notice some di￿erences.
First, the FOC (16a) with respect to L(r) contains one extra term - the second term on
the left-hand side. That is, the regulator, when choosing L(r), takes into account the
positive impact of L(r) on the production of all other sites, through knowledge spillovers.
So, increasing labor at r has two e￿ects: it increases output in the standard way, but
it increases the positive externalities at all other sites as well. In the same way, labor
increases at other sites increase the externality in r. This externality is now taken into
account, while the ￿rm, maximizing its own pro￿ts, considered the externality as a ￿xed
parameter.18
The second di￿erence between the optimum and the REE concerns the FOC with
respect to E(r), i.e. equation (16c). The ￿rst term in the left-hand side is the marginal
product of emissions, which is the same as the FOC of the REE. The di￿erence is in
the second term, which shows how changes in the value of emissions at r a￿ect the
concentration of pollution, not only at r but also at all other sites. This damage, which
is caused by the aggregate pollution in our spatial economy and is altered every time
emissions increase or decrease, is now taken into account by the regulator.
After making some transformations, we end up with the following system of second

































3(r) = "(r) (17c)




known functions. The existence and the uniqueness of the solution can be proved following
18See Appendix B.
19The analytical solution for the regulator’s optimum is available in the Internet version of the paper.
15the same steps which were presented in Section 2. To determine a numerical solution of
the problem, we follow the same method of Taylor-series expansion used in the REE
case. This approach provides an accurate approximate solution of the integral system as
demonstrated by some numerical examples in Section 5.
4 Optimal Policy Issues
The di￿erences between the REE and the regulator’s optimum give us some intuition
about the design of optimal policies. These di￿erences come from the fact that the pro-
duction externality z(r) and the concentration of pollution X(r) are taken as parameters
in the case of REE, while the regulator takes them into account. Speci￿cally, compar-
ing equations (10a) and (10c) with (16a) and (16c) respectively, we observe that the
latter equations have one extra term each. Thus, the FOC with respect to L(r) for
the REE equates the marginal product of labor with the given wage rate MPL = w,
while the same condition for the optimum is given by MPL + q z0(L) = w: The de-
sign of optimal policy in that case is determined by the extra term, q z0(L): So, setting
v￿(r) = q z0(L) = pe￿z(r)L(r)aK(r)bE(r)c￿
@z(r)
@L(r); the wage rate, at the optimum, is equal
to w = v￿(r) + MPL.20 Conceptually, the term v￿(r) takes into account the changes in
the knowledge spillovers across space, when a ￿rm employs more or fewer workers. The
function v￿(r) can also be considered as a subsidy that is given to ￿rms. In that way,
￿rms will have a lower labor cost, w ￿v￿(r), employ more labor, bene￿t from the higher
knowledge spillovers and produce more output.
Probably more interesting is the design of optimal environmental policy. Thus, the
￿rm trying to maximize its own pro￿ts equates the marginal product of emissions with
the tax imposed on each unit of emissions used in the production process, MPE = ￿(r),
while the regulator equates the marginal product of emissions with the marginal damage
of emissions, MPE = MDE: But the di￿erence between the MDE = ￿X(r)￿￿1 @X(r)
@E(r) and
the tax function ￿(r) = ￿ X(r)￿￿1 is created by the term
@X(r)
@E(r).21 This term shows that
20The term
@z(r)
@L(r) is de￿ned in Appendix B.
21We assume here that taxation at the REE charges the full marginal damage caused by the con-
16when a ￿rm increases (decreases) the amount of emissions used in the production process,
the concentration of pollution at all spatial points increases (decreases) as well. On the
other hand, in the REE case, each ￿rm decides about the amount of the emissions used as
an input, taking the concentration of pollution across space as given. It does not account
for the fact that its own emissions at r a￿ect the aggregate pollution in other areas. Thus,
the designer of optimal environmental policy has to consider the extra damage caused at
all spatial points from the emissions generated at r: As a result, the optimal tax function
has to satisfy ￿￿(r) = MDE = ￿X(r)￿￿1 @X(r)
@E(r) and ￿rms now equate MPE = ￿￿(r):
Thus, in the spatial model, a tax equal to full marginal damages at the REE, as de￿ned
in (5) with ￿ = 1; does not mean full internalization of the social cost as it is usually
understood in environmental economics without spatial considerations. This is because
setting ￿(r) = ￿ X(r)￿￿1 ignores this spatial externality which is captured by the term
@X(r)
@E(r). We will refer to setting the emission tax at ￿(r) as the myopic internalization and
setting it at ￿￿(r) as the optimal internalization. Finally, imposing the optimal policy
rules, v￿(r) and ￿￿(r); the REE can reproduce the optimum.
The enforcement of the optimal taxation, ￿￿(r), implies the implementation of a
di￿erent tax at each spatial point. Nevertheless, this is considered to be an unusual
scheme of taxation if we compare it to real environmental policies. For this reason, based
on the optimal taxation analysed above, the regulator could enforce zoning taxation. In
that case, we would have areas or zones with a ￿at environmental tax. More speci￿cally, in
the areas with high concentration of economic activity, which su￿er from serious pollution
problems, the environmental tax will be high, but constant. Thus, in the interval [s1;s2] 2





The regulator, in order to implement the e￿cient allocation as an equilibrium, uses
the two instruments analysed above: the subsidy v￿(r) and the environmental tax ￿￿(r):
As far as the subsidy is concerned, the regulator gives some money to the ￿rms, so as to




v￿(s) ds: In a similar way, the aggregate amount of money he receives from
centration of pollution at a speci￿c site, so ￿ = 1 and   = ￿: The term
@X(r)
@E(r) is de￿ned in Appendix
B.
17the enforcement of the optimal environmental tax is
Z S
0
￿￿(s) ds: It’s easy to predict
that the tax revenues and the subsidy expenditures will not equal one another in most
cases. However, in the optimum, we should achieve a balanced budget. In cases where the






￿￿(s) ds; the regulator
could impose a lump-sum tax on land owners. Then, the tax per unit of land would be











v￿(s) ds; the regulator could give a lump-sum
subsidy to ￿rms. In order to receive this ￿nancial support, the ￿rms could for example be
obliged to ￿nance R&D in pollution control and clean production processes. The subsidy




[￿￿(s) ￿ v￿(s)] ds:
5 Numerical Experiments
The model of the business sector of a single city analysed above involves ￿fteen parame-
ters: ￿; b; c; ￿; ￿; S; ￿; p; w; pK; ￿ r; ￿; ￿; ￿;  : Given these parameters, we can predict
both the REE and the optimal patterns of output on the given interval. The correspond-
ing distributions of output, labor, machinery and emissions will determine the location
of ￿rms in both cases and will characterize the optimal spatial policies. The numerical
approach of the Taylor-series expansion, described above, will give us the equilibrium and
the optimal values of inputs and output.
The map of a city will be de￿ned by the two opposing forces already mentioned.
On the one hand, there are the production externalities and the transportation cost of
machinery that pull economic activity together and, on the other hand, there are the cost
of environmental policy and the \immobility" of land that push it apart. This trade-o￿
between centripetal and centrifugal forces will determine the geographical structure of
the economy. Giving di￿erent values to the parameters, we may end up in a monocentric
economy which presents the clustering of economic activity around a spatial point, or in
a pattern where the economic activity will be concentrated in two or more regions.
The simulations discussed in this section will provide maps resulting from the models
18of Sections 2 and 3. The share of labor is set to ￿ = 0:6, the share of the machinery is
b = 0:25 and the share of emissions is c = 0:05. Given these values, we let the implied
share of land be 0:1. The length of the city is S = 2￿: In the business sector analysed here,
we consider wages (w = 1) and the price of machinery (pK = 1) as given and the same is
assumed for the price of output which is p = 10: We set a reasonable value for ￿; that is
0:01.22 We also assume that there is a port at the point ￿ r = ￿. The value ￿ = 1:5 implies
an increasing and convex damage function. The ￿ parameter is set to 1: Finally, the ￿
parameter, which shows how much emissions generated at site r a￿ect the concentration
of pollution in nearby areas, is set to 0:5.23 To study the economy’s possible spatial
structure, we hold the above parameters constant and vary just the transportation cost
￿, the \strength" of knowledge spillovers ￿ and the   parameter, which indicates whether
the taxation internalizes fully or partly the marginal damage caused by the concentration
of pollution and determines the stringency of environmental policy.
As a benchmark case, we study the distribution of economic activity under no ag-
glomeration forces, i.e. ￿ = 0; ￿ = 0; ￿ = 0; ￿ = 0;   = 0: This means that there is no
production externality, no transportation cost for machinery and no environmental policy
to increase the cost of the production process. In other words, a ￿rm doesn’t bene￿t
at all from nearby ￿rms, doesn’t pay anything for the emissions used in production, and
the per unit cost of machinery is the same at all locations. As expected, Figure 1 shows
that the distribution of production is uniform over the given interval. In that case, ￿rms
have no incentives to locate at any special point of our economy.
Changing the parameters results in di￿erent maps. As we have a lot of parameters in
our model, the results we can obtain are numerous too. We will present some interesting
cases below which are worth mentioning and explain the structure of the model. Each
set of parameters will provide di￿erent maps, all presenting the distribution of economic
22This value of ￿ is low enough to ensure that the \no black hole" assumption, described in Fujita,
Krugman and Venables [8], holds.
23This value of ￿ was chosen so that the emissions generated at the city centre (￿ r = ￿) have a negligible
e￿ect on the aggregate level of pollution at the two boundary points (r = 0; S). When we study the
e￿ect of taxation on the spatial structure, we will give one more value to ￿ in order to show how, under
the assumption of \more localized" pollution, the environmental policy changes the concentration of
economic activity.
19activity. More speci￿cally, we will study the REE and the regulator’s optimum, both
in cases where environmental regulations are enforced and in cases where there are no
environmental considerations. This allows us to present the di￿erences between the REE
and the optimum and to explain how environmental policy a￿ects the spatial structure
of our city, on the interval [0;S]:
5.1 Knowledge Spillovers
Figure 2 presents the distribution of economic activity resulting from the ￿ values of 1,
2 and 3. The higher ￿ is, the more pro￿table it is for ￿rms to locate near each other,
so as to bene￿t from positive knowledge spillovers. In other words,the centripetal force
of production externality is stronger when ￿ is high, and as a result, economic activity
is more concentrated at certain sites. We also use two values of transportation cost:
￿ = 0:045 and ￿ = 0:075: Moreover, in these examples, the marginal damage caused by
the concentration of emissions is fully internalised (  = 1:5):
The ￿rst two maps present the rational expectations equilibrium under environmen-
tal policy. The lowest value of ￿ is the closest to the benchmark case of the uniform
distribution of production. In the ￿rst map, the transportation cost is low. Also, the
low value of ￿ means that knowledge spillovers do not decline fast with distance. So,
the two centripetal forces do not have a strong e￿ect and the result is the distribution
of production given by the dotted line. When ￿ increases, there are two e￿ects: ￿rst,
spillovers a￿ect the output more and the production increases at each site, and second,
there are more incentives for agglomerations because bene￿ts decline faster with dis-
tance. But, to produce more output, ￿rms use more emissions and the concentration
of pollution increases at each point. When the concentration of pollution is very high,
the price of emissions is high too. So, when ￿rms decide where to locate, they take into
account the centripetal force of strong knowledge spillovers and the centrifugal force of
strict environmental policy. The trade-o￿ between these two opposing forces forms the
three peaks we observe in case ￿ = 3 (solid line). The conclusions are, more or less, the
same, if we observe the second map. The only di￿erence comes from the higher value
20of transportation cost (￿ = 0:075): So, here the higher transportation cost decreases the
concentration of economic activity in areas near the boundaries. In that way, the two
peaks near the boundaries (in case ￿ = 2; 3), are lower. However, the central peak is
higher (if compared to the boundary ones), as the transportation cost around the city
centre is low in every case.
In the same ￿gure, we also observe the REE without environmental considerations. In
that case, ￿rms do not have to pay a price or a \tax" for the emissions generated during the
production process. In other words, emissions here are considered to be a free good and
the cost of production is lower. The economic activity is now concentrated around the city
centre, because of the two centripetal forces: the transportation cost and the knowledge
spillovers. Stronger knowledge spillovers lead to a higher distribution of economic activity
at the city centre. The use of land as a production factor deters economic activity from
concentrating entirely at the city centre. The absence of environmental policy allows the
formation of a unique peak and a monocentric city.
Finally, Figure 2 shows the optimal distribution of economic activity under environ-
mental policy. As stated above, the regulator takes into account how labor in one area
bene￿ts from labor in nearby areas and how emissions in one area a￿ect the concentra-
tion of pollution in other areas. In that way, the regulator internalizes the production
externality and the damage caused by the use of emissions in the production process. The
result is the formation of two peaks near the points r = 1:6; 4:7. The explanation is
the following: at the optimum with environmental considerations, the regulator realizes
the positive interaction of ￿rms located at nearby areas, but he also takes into account
the fact that if all ￿rms locate around \one" spatial point, then the cost of environmen-
tal policy will be very high. So, the optimal solution is to cluster around \two points".
We should also notice that the higher transportation cost (beta=0:075) leads to a lower
concentration of economic activity around the two peaks.24 The optimal distribution, if
there is no environmental policy, is illustrated by a unique peak. Comparing the REE
24At the optimum, the solid line corresponds to ￿ = 3: The two peaks of that line do not appear in the
￿gure, because we wanted to draw all three curves in one ￿gure, so as to point out the di￿erences. So,
at the spatial points r = 1:6; 4:7; where we have the two peaks, the corresponding distribution value
for ￿ = 0:045 is 1:5 ￿ 107 ; and for ￿ = 0:075 is 1 ￿ 107:
21and the optimum, in case there are no environmental considerations, we notice that the
regulator, by internalizing the production externality, leads to a higher distribution of
economic activity at each spatial point.
Taking everything into account, in both cases (REE and optimum), the environmental
policy works to discourage the clustering of economic activity around one spatial point,
which would occur in its absence.
5.2 Transportation Cost
Machinery is available at the city centre (￿ r = ￿) without transportation cost. When ￿rms
use machinery at a site di￿erent from ￿ r = ￿; they are obliged to pay a transportation
cost. To study how changes in transportation cost a￿ect the spatial structure of our city,
we use the values ￿ = 0:045; 0:06 and 0:075: The high value of ￿ (0.075), was selected
to double the per unit price of machinery at the boundaries (r = 0; S) and the low value
of ￿ (0.045) to increase the per unit price of machinery by 50% at the same points. These
values of ￿ are combined with ￿ values of 1 and 3 and the results are shown in Figure 3.
In the ￿rst map, we observe the clustering of economic activity around the city centre,
which is the result of the low value of ￿.25 Higher transportation costs (solid line) imply
lower densities at the boundaries and at all other points, except for ￿ r = ￿. This is the
case of REE. The centripetal and centrifugal forces are not very strong here and economic
activity is concentrated around the centre, as the point ￿ r = ￿ has a spatial advantage:
machinery is available without transportation cost. For ￿ = 3, the low transportation
cost forms three peaks. This is the result of the trade-o￿ between knowledge spillovers and
environmental policy.26 However, higher values of ￿ lead to a lower concentration around
the two boundary peaks, as it is more expensive now to transport a lot of machinery to
spatial points far from the city centre.
As far as the optimum is concerned, we have the formation of the two peaks analysed
above. Higher values of ￿ imply lower densities of output around the two peaks in both
cases. In all examples, where there is no environmental policy to act as a centrifugal force,
25See the analysis for Knowledge Spillovers above.
26See the analysis for Knowledge Spillovers above.
22we have a unique peak around the central point. In all other spatial points, increases
in ￿ decrease the distribution of economic activity. The only di￿erence is that the total
output produced in the optimum case is higher if compared to the REE case.
5.3 Environmental Policy
In analysing environmental policy, we do not consider optimal emission taxes as de￿ned
in Section 4, but emission taxes at the REE as de￿ned by (5).27 Firms at the REE pay a
\tax" or a \price" for each unit of emissions used in the production process. As already
stated, this tax depends on the concentration of pollution at each spatial point and the
tax rate is a function of the marginal damage caused in the economy by the aggregate
level of pollution at a given point. Depending on the stringency of environmental policy,
this form of taxation could fully or partly internalize the marginal damage. The strict or
the lax environmental policy determines the amount of money ￿rms are obliged to pay
for the emissions they generate. So, the   parameter shows the degree of internalization:
  = 1:5 means full internalization and every value of   which is 0 <   < 1:5 implies
lower taxation and less strength of centrifugal force.
In Figure 4, we observe the distribution of economic activity using di￿erent values of
 : The ￿rst map is drawn for ￿ = 0:5 and the second one for ￿ = 2: The higher value of
￿ means that pollution is more localized and a￿ects only nearby areas compared to the
lower one. Let’s explain ￿rst why ￿ = 0:5 leads to the clustering of economic activity
in three peaks, while ￿ = 2 forms a unique peak. Under low values of ￿; emissions at
each site pollute other sites that are far away. But, if each site is a￿ected by emissions
generated at a lot of sites, farther or closer, the concentration of pollution would be higher
at each spatial point. In that case, ￿rms avoid locating all at the same spatial point, so as
not to increase further the \price" of emissions. For this reason, we have the clustering of
production in three peaks. When pollution is more localized (￿ = 2) emissions generated
at one site do not a￿ect other sites a lot and so the \price" of emissions is lower. Then,
￿rms have a stronger incentive to locate near each other in order to bene￿t from knowledge
27The imposition of optimal taxes would reproduce the optimum (Figures 2 and 3).
23spillovers. This is the case presented in the second map.
As far as the stringency of environmental policy is concerned, the results could be
easily predicted. Strict environmental policy and full internalization of marginal damage
lead to a lower distribution of production in every case. On the other hand, more lenient
environmental regulations not only lead to a higher distribution at each site but also
promote the agglomeration of economic activity around the city centre. So, the intu-
ition is simple: environmental policy deters the clustering of production and makes the
distribution of economic activity ￿atter.28 In other words, strict environmental policy
makes the distribution of economic activity less uneven. This result is consistent with
the empirical literature, according to which environmental regulations restrict economic
activity and result in a spreading out or an exiting of polluting ￿rms.29
5.4 Two Regions: Pollution Haven Hypothesis
In previous sections, we have assumed the existence of a single city with borders 0 and
2￿: Now, we can divide this space into two regions, where the ￿rst region (A) is located
between 0 and ￿ and the second one (B) between ￿ and 2￿: Let’s suppose that each
region adopts di￿erent environmental regulations: in region A, environmental policy is
very strict, while in region B; it is more lenient. The degree of stringency, in our model,
is determined by the parameter  : If   = 1:5, the government charges the full marginal
damage caused by the concentration of pollution and if 0 <   < 1:5, the environmental
policy is laxer as the marginal damage is partly internalized. We let region A enforce
strict measures in order to protect the environment (  = 1:5) and region B adopt less
severe environmental regulations. The rest of the structure of the model remains the
same. Machinery is now available at the boundary between the two regions, at ￿ r = ￿. As
a result, this point still has an advantage: there is no transportation cost for machinery.
In that context, it’s interesting to study how environmental policy a￿ects the distribution
and the relocation of economic activity in both regions.
In Figure 5, we use two di￿erent values for   in region B :   = 0:3 (map a) and   = 0:9
28The proof of ￿atness is presented in Appendix D.
29See Introduction: Greenstone [12], Henderson [14].
24(map b). It is obvious that the di￿erent environmental policies lead to a relocation of
pollution industries between the two regions. Thus, there is a high clustering of economic
activity at the right of r = ￿; and a lower one on the left side. In that way, ￿rms locating
in region B try to avoid the increased cost of emissions in region A. The more lenient
the environmental policy in region B is, the higher its concentration of economic activity
is compared to region A’s.
This result can be associated with the \pollution haven hypothesis", according to
which polluting industries have a tendency to relocate to areas with less stringent en-
vironmental regulations. In other words, countries or regions with weak environmental
regulations provide a \haven" to polluting ￿rms which come from countries with strict
environmental laws. A few empirical methods have been used so far to test whether
the hypothesis is con￿rmed. Earlier studies, based on cross section data, failed to prove
the pollution haven hypothesis. However, more recent studies using panel data and
￿xed-e￿ect models to control for unobserved heterogeneity and instrumental variables to
control for simultaneity, and taking into account other factors a￿ecting trade and invest-
ment ￿ows, lead to more con￿rming results.30 According to Ben Kheder and Zugravu [3],
the reason for the lack of robust empirical proof for the pollution haven hypothesis is that
the stringency of the environmental regulations is not the only factor determining the lo-
cation decisions of ￿rms. Speci￿cally, other factors, such as the endowments of quali￿ed
human capital and physical capital, weak institutions, high corruption level, lack of civil
freedoms’ and property rights’ protection, play an important role in the relocation of
pollution industries. So, by applying a geographic economy model to French ￿rm-level
data and considering many of these factors, they succeeded in con￿rming the essential
role played by environmental regulations in determining ￿rm’s location.
30For a review of the literature on the pollution haven hypothesis, see Brunnermeier and Levinson [6]
and Taylor [33].
256 Conclusion
Our model consists of a single city - of length S - in which ￿rms are free to choose
where to locate. The city has a nonuniform internal structure because of externalities in
production, spatial inhomogeneity, transportation cost of the machinery input and envi-
ronmental policy. Speci￿cally, when ￿rms take location decisions, they consider certain
facts. First, labor at each location will be more productive if there is a high concentra-
tion of labor at nearby locations. This is the assumption of knowledge spillovers. Second,
the transportation of machinery is costly and its cost depends on the distance from the
city centre. Finally, the use of emissions as an input in the production process induces
the environmental regulator to adopt some kind of environmental policy. The stringency
and, therefore, the cost of this policy for the ￿rms is an increasing function of the con-
centration of pollution at each spatial point. If all ￿rms decide to locate around the
city centre, they will bene￿t from positive knowledge spillovers and avoid paying a high
transportation cost for machinery. So, these forces promote agglomeration. On the other
hand, if they all locate at that point, the concentration of pollution will be high and
they will be obliged to pay higher taxation. As a result, environmental policy impedes
agglomeration. The trade-o￿ between centripetal and centrifugal forces determines both
the REE and the optimal concentration of economic activity. Comparing the equilibrium
and the optimal outcomes, we derived and characterized optimal spatial policies.
The results of our analysis con￿rm the existing theoretical and empirical literature
in the following way. Under the assumption of strong knowledge spillovers, ￿rms have a
strong desire to locate near other producers. When the transportation cost of machinery
increases, ￿rms move closer to the city centre. Furthermore, when the environmental
policy is strict, the distribution of production becomes ￿atter. In other words, ￿rms
have fewer incentives for agglomeration and concentration of economic activity. Thus,
environmental policy tends to discourage the clustering of economic activity that would
occur in its absence. Finally, we showed that if there are two bordering regions with
di￿erent environmental policies, the region which has enforced more lenient environmental
regulation will provide a \haven" for polluting industries.
26The new results that were obtained by our paper suggest some important implications.
First, the REE results either in a monocentric or in a polycentric city. What is also
signi￿cant is that in both cases, the port attracts a large number of ￿rms and there is
always clustering of economic activity around this site. On the other hand, the regulator’s
optimum - where environmental damages and knowledge spillovers are fully internalized
- results in a bicentric city. However, contrary to the REE case, neither of the two peaks
is around the city centre, where the port is available. Notice that these results hold
even if we change the location of the port and non-symmetric patterns are derived.31 In
particular, at the REE, ￿rms \follow" the port and thus, there is still a high concentration
of economic activity around this spatial point. The optimal distribution is again presented
by a bicentric city, but now the two peaks are not symmetric: the peak which is closer
to the port is always higher. Finally, when we assume that no environmental policy is
enforced for the emissions generated in the production process, then the spatial patterns
derived are the same in both cases of the REE and the optimum: economic activity is
concentrated around a unique site, which is always the port.
Using the present model, we can study many aspects of the internal structure of cities
under environmental policy. A possible extension could be to study the dynamic problem
of location decisions of ￿rms. This can be done by considering pollution accumulation
and capital accumulation over time. In that way, we could explain the structure of cities
not only across space, but also across time. What is also interesting and appealing is the
empirical work based on models of New Economic Geography. As far as we know, there
is a limited number of empirical papers relevant to the literature.32 In that context, we
could test the e￿ects of environmental policy on urban structure. These thoughts are left
for future research.
31See the supplementary material, provided on the Internet version of the paper, for maps presenting
changes in the location of the port.
32For example, Ioannides et al. [15] study the e￿ects of information and communication technologies
on urban structure.
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30Appendix A: Solving a system of second kind Fredholm integral equations, following
the modi￿ed Taylor-series expansion method (Maleknejad et al. [25]).





















ln(L(s))ds + alnL(r) + blnK(r) + (c ￿ 1)lnE(r)
































We transform the system in order to obtain a system of second kind Fredholm integral
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"(s)ds + g3(r) = "(r) (A3)
where:
g1(r) = 1
1￿a￿b￿cf(1 ￿ b ￿ c) [lna + lnp ￿ lnw] +
b [lnp + lnb ￿ lnpK ￿ ￿(r ￿ ￿ r)
2] + c [lnc + lnp ￿ ln ]g
g2(r) = 1
1￿a￿b￿cfa [lna + lnp ￿ lnw] +
(1 ￿ a ￿ c) [lnp + lnb ￿ lnpK ￿ ￿(r ￿ ￿ r)
2] + c [lnc + lnp ￿ ln ]g
g3(r) = 1
1￿a￿b￿cfa [lna + lnp ￿ lnw] +
b [lnp + lnb ￿ lnpK ￿ ￿(r ￿ ￿ r)
2] + (1 ￿ a ￿ b) [lnc + lnp ￿ ln ]g
Taylor-series expansions can be made for the solutions y(s) and "(s) :
y(s) = y(r) + y






"(s) = "(r) + "























































































2g ds + g3(r)



























































































































































































































If the integrals in equations (A7)-(A9) can be solved analytically, then the bracketed
quantities are functions of r alone. So (A7)-(A9) become a linear system of ordinary
di￿erential equations that can be solved, if we use an appropriate number of boundary
conditions.
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3(r): Substituting them into (A7), (A8) & (A9), we have a linear
system of three algebraic equations that can be solved using Mathematica.
Appendix B: The same method of modi￿ed Taylor-series expansion was used in
order to solve for the regulator’s optimum. The FOC for the optimum, (16a),(16c),
contain two terms that need to be determined:
#z(r)



















e￿￿(s￿r)2ds: Using these two terms, we follow the
method analysed in Appendix A to ￿nd the optimal solution.
35Appendix C: Transformation of the system (11) to a single Fredholm equation of
2nd kind (Polyanin and Manzhirov [28]).
We de￿ne the functions Y (r) and G(r) on [0;3S], where Y (r) = yi(r ￿ (i ￿ 1)S)
and G(r) = gi(r ￿ (i ￿ 1)S) for (i ￿ 1)S ￿ r ￿ iS:33 Next, we de￿ne the kernel C(r;s)
on the square [0;3S] ￿ [0;3S] as follows: C(r;s) = kij(r ￿ (i ￿ 1)S; s ￿ (j ￿ 1)S) for
(i ￿ 1)S ￿ r ￿ iS and (j ￿ 1)S ￿ s ￿ jS:
So, the system (11) can be rewritten as the single Fredholm equation:
Y (r) ￿ 1
1￿a￿b￿c
R 3S
0 C(r;s) Y (s) ds = G(r), where 0 ￿ r ￿ 3S:
If the kernels kij(r;s) are square integrable on the square [0;S] ￿ [0;S] and gi(r) are
square integrable functions on [0;S], then the kernel C(r;s) is square integrable on the
new square: [0;3S] ￿ [0;3S] and G(r) is square integrable on [0;3S]:
Appendix D: Figure 4: Proof of ￿atness.
In order to measure ￿atness, we use the concept of curvature. Curvature is the
amount by which a geometric object deviates from being ￿at, or straight in the case of




￿ ￿ ￿; where
q(r) = exp(￿z(r))L(r)aK(r)bE(r)c; is the production function. We use Mathematica to
measure the curvature of lines in Figure 4. In map 4(a), at the point r = ￿, the dotted
line has ￿(￿) = 168;174, the dashed line has ￿(￿) = 190;340 and the solid line has
￿(￿) = 248;240: In ￿gure 4(b), at the point r = ￿, the dotted line has ￿(￿) = 360;077,
the dashed line has ￿(￿) = 425;289 and the solid line has ￿(￿) = 608;352: The ￿attest
curve is the one with the lowest curvature value, i.e. the dotted line (in both cases).
Another way to measure the curvature at a speci￿c point is to use the approach of
the osculating circle. According to it, from any point of any curve, where the curvature
is non-zero, there is a unique circle which most closely approximates the curve near that
point. This is the osculating circle at that point. The radius (R) of the osculating circle
determines the curvature at that point in the following way: ￿ = 1
R:
So, we draw the osculating circles at point r = ￿, of the curves, in Figure 4:
33We assume that y1 = y, y2 = x and y3 = "; so as to follow the notation of our model.
36(a) (b)
Figure 4(a): Let R11 be the radius of the osculating circle of the solid line, R12
be the radius of the osculating circle of the dashed line and R13 be the radius of the
osculating circle of the dotted line, then it is obvious that R11 < R12 < R13. Also, if the
corresponding curvatures are ￿11 = 1
R11, ￿12 = 1
R12 and ￿13 = 1
R13, then ￿11 > ￿12 > ￿13: As
a result, the dotted line is the ￿attest curve. In a similar way, we prove that the dotted
curve of Figure 4(b) is the ￿attest one.
Figures
Figure 1: Benchmark case: The Distribution of Economic Activity under no Agglomera-
tion Forces










Figure 2: The Distribution of Economic Activity: Changes in the values of delta. Dotted
Line: delta=1, Dashed Line: delta=2, Solid Line: delta=3










Figure 3: The Distribution of Economic Activity: Changes in the values of transportation
cost. Dotted Line: beta=0.045, Dashed Line: beta=0.06, Solid Line: beta=0.075
39(a): ￿ = 0:5 (b): ￿ = 2
Figure 4: The Distribution of Economic Activity: Changes in the values of psi. Dotted
Line: psi=1.5, Dashed Line: psi=0.9, Solid Line: psi=0.3.
(a): Region A (left):   = 1:5 and
Region B (right):   = 0:3
(b): Region A (left):   = 1:5 and
Region B (right):   = 0:9
Figure 5: The Distribution of Economic Activity Under Di￿erent Environmental Regu-
lations (beta=0.06, delta=2 and zeta=2)
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